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Indian affairs in the United States are rather more significant than the 
small proportion of surviving natives in the national population would indi-
cate. This significance comes primarily from the powerful position of the 
country in international affairs. It derives secondarily from the extensive 
study of tribal peoples and government carried out in this country, for these 
peoples constitute a great natural laboratory for experimentation in inter-
group relations, and principles applicable to parallel situations overseas 
can be discovered.1 From this national laboratory have come social science 
generalizations about relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous 
peoples anywhere in the world. One set of human relations principles of 
this sort, for example, was enunciated by former Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs John Collier.2 
Enough events have transpired within our natural social laboratory to 
allow us to judge the validity of our social scientists ' generalizations. Yet, 
for all the attention that has been devoted to tribal peoples in the U . S . , one 
of the most significant developments of the past several years seems to have 
escaped published notice or recognition as an index of the scientific validity 
of the generalizations about group behavior advanced by Collier. 
The general sequence of events in tribal administration in the United 
States is well known and documented. A process of change in the social 
structure of administration of tribal peoples was triggered by Collier when 
he became Commissioner of Indian Affair s in 1933. The basic principle upon 
which Collier based his program was, in his words, that Mthe experience of 
responsible democracy is, of all experiences, the most therapeutic, the 
most disciplinary, the most dynamogenic and the most productive of effi-
ciency. " 3 The other basic ingredient of Collier's administrative philoso-
phy may be summed up as a generalized faith that tribal societies possessed 
what Leighton calls "morale . ! t 4 Some such notion is a necessary base for 
Collier's somewhat mystical belief that tribal societies either existed or 
could be created and given all democratic freedoms. 5 This adds up to de-
fining the state as the guardian of cultural pluralism, even to its fostering 
cultural autonomy of its components. 6 
To evaluate what the Collier program has produced in the years since 
1933, one must have in mind the situation that existed when he brought his 
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faith to bear on practical administration. For approximately eighty years 
prior to 1933 the administration of tribal peoples in the U.S. had been aimed 
at the destruction of native culture, the breaking up of native social organi-
zations and the individualization of native land holdings.7 Key beliefs behind 
this program were that tribal land ownership was too different from Anglo-
Saxon individual ownership to be tolerated, and tribal religions too barbarous 
to be allowed to flourish. $ In a period of domestic imperialism, such domi-
nant group beliefs and goals were implemented by a linear social structure 
of tribal administration. This was quite similar to tribal administrations 
in Africa, India, Australia and Canada where other native peoples were 
restricted geographically to segregated reserved areas by English-speaking 
conquerors. This system evidently arose out of British governmental habits 
and attitudes toward non-English speaking peoples. A specific administrat-
ive apparatus within the U.S. government was developed, in addition, for 
dealing with natives. 
Known usually as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, this agency originated 
in the War Department and was incorporated into the Department of the 
Interior somewhat over a century ago. After final military defeat of the 
various tribes and withdrawal by the army from active participation in 
native administration, the BIA long enjoyed a near-monopoly on govern-
mental control and direction of tribal societies, especially on Southwestern 
reserves. Yet, these reservations remained largely unallotted, and native 
religions survived, since the administrative effort "bogged down in its own 
complexities. "9 
During this period, relations between the dominant and subordinate 
societies tended to move in straight lines from BIA administrators to 
tribesmen, or vice versa (see Diagram I). Thus contacts of tribesmen with 
individual members of the dominant society were sharply restricted in the 
reserve areas, particularly where the reserve areas were relativety iso-
lated. Since BIA personnel was a highly selected and atypical sample of the 
general population of the nation, tribesmen inevitably acquired a distorted 
impression of the dominant society and its culture. It seems to be difficult 
for groups in such contact to be truly representative of their respective 
societies. ^ The welfare of tribesmen was largely dependent upon the 
actions of BIA personnel, and administrative behavior often appeared capri-
cious and unpredictable to tribesmen of cultural traditions very different 
from those of the administrators. This was perhaps most often true in the 
cases of Southwestern tribesmen, who had relatively less formal education 
than Indians elsewhere in the nation as time went on. The result was the 
generation of considerable psychological s t ress among the tribal popula-
t ions . 1 1 Frequently, the s t ress became intolerable and tribesmen r e -
sponded with behavioral patterns of apathy, hatred, hostility and at times 
destructive action common to subordinated ethnic groups the world over. 
Such emotions and actions oftentimes were directed at other members of 
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the subordinated group, and seldom could individual tribesmen take inte-
grated, efficient action toward overcoming the sources of their s t ress . 
Then, as Collier reported his stewardship: "We tried to extend to the 
tribes a self-governing self-determination without any limit beyond the need 
to advance by stages to the goal. "12 in essence, he provided every possible 
encouragement to the foundation of formal constitutional self-government 
within the external forms of U.S. democracy. This interposed a tribal gov-
ernment composed of elected representatives between the individual t r ibes-
man and the full force of the administrative apparatus. Wherever tribal gov-
ernments were organized, tribesmen now had slightly more chance to take 
efficient and integrated action toward overcoming the sources of at least some 
s t resses induced by their subordinate socio-economic and political status. 
Therein lay, perhaps, the therapeutic value of tribal self-government in its 
opening phase — in reducing existing causes of serious psychological s t ress . 
Not everything which has happened on reservations since 1933 has been 
due, of course, to John Collier. Partly by administrative intention within 
the B1A and largely by accident, the monopolistic hold of the BIA on national 
interaction with tribal peoples was rapidly broken during the 1930's and 1940fs 
at the same time that the experiment in tribal self-determination was initi-
ated. Since the Southwestern Indians were perhaps most heavily subjected 
to the BIA monolith, the change has possibly been greatest among them. 
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Indians are now accustomed to dealing with many federal agencies and 
some state agencies on an individual and a tribal basis . This shift began on 
a large scale with the inauguration of an Indian Division of the Civilian Con-
servation Corps . 1 3 It continued with proliferation of governmental contacts 
with such agencies as the Production Marketing Administration, the Office 
of Price Administration, Selective Service and the public schools educating 
tribal children under provisions of the Johnson-0TMalley Act. * 4 it reached 
the point of division of direct administrative responsibility in the fall of 
1955 when the U. S. Public Health Service took over entire responsibility 
for Indian health from the BIA. 1 5 
All this complication of relationships between Indians and the govern-
ment made the administrative organization far more complex than before. It 
afforded emergent tribal governments considerable room in which to maneu-
ver and decrease causes of psychological s t ress among their constituents. 
But it altered only slightly the essentially linear nature of the relationships 
between tribesmen in subordinate power positions and non-Indians in domi-
nant roles. 
All these changes occurred during what might be termed Phase I of 
the development of tribal self-determination in the United States. This 
phase ended formally with promulgation of the "withdrawal" or termination 
policy of the BIA and Congress, as announced by Assistant Commissioner 
John Provinse before the National Conference of Social Work at San Fran-
cisco, April 14, 1947. 1 6 Implementation of this policy began in 1950 under 
Commissioner Dillon S. M y e r , 1 7 and intensified in 1953 when Congress 
voted to permit states to assume legal jurisdiction on reservation l ands . 1 8 
Since then, Phase n has developed, not clearly at first, but recently 
with greater clarity of form. Yet the numerous evaluations of the "Collier 
program" which have appeared in print have hardly distinguished this new 
phase, nor have its indices been recognized. 19 
To be sure, Collier has himself pointed out that since his resignation 
as Commissioner, tribes have faced increasingly hostile administrators in 
the BIA and legislators in the Congress during the drive begun in 1950 and 
continued through most of the Eisenhower administration to withdraw fed-
eral services, terminate land trusteeship, subject reserve areas and their 
residents to state jurisdiction, and generally to remove national govern-
ment from Indian administration.2 0 Deciding that this administration ig-
nored elected tribal representatives, and stated a policy of subordinating 
tribal to individual interests, the former Commissioner wrote that: "The 
immediate prospect is bleak and grim in the United States. " 2 1 Yet this was 
only the negative side of the total situation — neutral or overtly hostile ad-
ministrators toughening up on the tribal governments which had been sym-
pathetically nursed into being by the Collier regime. There is also a posi-
tive part of the situation that this paper seeks to point out. 
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The beginning of this favorable aspect of Phase II of the development 
of tribal self-determination dates roughly from 1946 when legislation was 
passed by Congress which set off a new direction of growth. Not all tribes 
have yet entered this new phase, of course, just as there was considerable 
time lag between passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (48 Stat. 984) in 
1934 and the actual beginnings of forma] self-governments on the reserves . 
In general, the social structure of tribal administration and of transcultura-
tion was markedly altered through the introduction of a new feature of inter -
group interactions which can be traced in large part to the Indian Claims 
Commission Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 1049). That act itself produced notable 
changes in the economies of several t r i be s . 2 2 The additional dimension 
considered in this paper is that of legal counsel hired on a year-round 
basis, paid and fired by the tribal government. In one case the author knows 
of, a Northwest Coast tribe has decided good representation was important 
enough to hire an attorney fresh out of law school, and suffer some losses 
while he learned the specialty of Indian law, because the tribe had in mind 
the long-term goal of obtaining capable, sympathetic counsel. 
Attorneys are actually only one type of non-Indian specialist now em-
ployed by various tr ibes. The outside consultant takes many professional 
forms today.2^ The attorney is , however, the specialist most frequently 
employed by tribes on a permanent basis, and he occupies such a critical 
socio-political position in intergroup relations that only this key example of 
the general class of outside consultants is here considered. 
Prior to 1946 few tribal governments retained general counsel as 
such. When tribes hired lawyers, they usually did so for a limited period 
to handle a specific case of an emergency nature. The Klamath reservation 
Indians, for example, retained an attorney in an allotment-period struggle 
with the Superintendent over election of Indian judges and policemen.2 4 
Since 1946, most tribes have retained general counsel, the sharpest break 
with the past having come perhaps among Southwestern tr ibes. The impe-
tus for this change clearly came from the Indian Claims Commission Act, a 
general enabling act empowering any tribe feeling it had a valid claim 
against the U. S. to bring suit for recovery before a special commission 
established by the Act. To file such suits tribes necessarily had to hire 
attorneys. As a result, many tribes have recovered damages from the 
United States. This paper is not concerned with these direct benefits but 
with indirect and unforeseen advantages obtained through a significant 
change in the social structure of Indian affairs. 
Many of the attorneys hired to present claims cases had had no p r e -
vious experience with Indian legal matters. A high proportion were appar-
ently of higher caliber than had been involved in Indian law before, although 
there have been a few notorious exceptions. 2 5 Once tribes made their ini-
tial contact with attorneys, many of the latter discovered that their clients 
stood in need of legal services of a type provided by general counsel on an 
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annual retainer basis, and undertook to represent tribes in matters other 
than claims. Many attorneys found that their personal value systems 
impelled them to champion the subordinate ethnic groups against their own 
dominant group. 
As their experience with individual attorneys broadened, several 
tribes that first hired general counsel incidental to a claims case switched 
horses in midstream. Indian tribal officials appeared to be quite capable 
of jettisoning the type of attorney who sought employment in hopes of finan-
cial profit alone, and finding one who held genuine sympathy for tribal aspi-
rations. The utility of tribally-employed general counsel has been such 
that once a tribe has enjoyed the services of a lawyer in this role, it usually 
continues to employ one, although it may change individuals. 
The ways in which a general counsel aids his tribal employers are 
numberless. When full-blood and mixed blood Utes of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, Utah, fell out over the division of a Court of Claims award 
made in 1950, the tribal attorney helped a special tribal legislative com-
mittee work out a plan to partition the tribe and its a s s e t s . 2 6 (This award 
stemmed from a special enabling act passed in 1938 and not from the later 
Indian Claims Commission Act. ) 2 ^ 
In this emergent pattern of social interaction involving tribal peoples 
in the United States, the tribal attorney constitutes a "third force" in the 
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reserve area administrative set-up. He forms the third point on an inter-
action triangle (see Diagram HI)', remaining physically outside the reserve 
except when conducting business there. He may actually spend only a few 
hours attending monthly business meetings of the governing body of the r e -
serve to which he drives or flies, so his personal contacts are limited to 
top tribal officers. 
On the other hand, the effects of what he does reach every member of 
the tribe. He brings to this job, moreover, all his professional, political 
and social associations with members of the dominant society. Since his 
client is the tribe, he is paid to work for its interests regardless of the 
wishes of BIA administrators or any other member of the dominant group. 
The tribal government with counsel can, therefore, at any time short c i r -
cuit through him the old "direct wire" to the BIA and seek to achieve its 
goals through the attorney and a triangular interaction pattern. 
Being outside the old chain of command, the attorney can and does 
operate at any level of that hierarchy at any time. The angle of the triangle 
of interaction varies constantly up and down: the attorney intervenes for 
his tribal client with the reserve superintendent, Area Office of the BIA, 
its Washington headquarters, with administrative superiors of the BIA in 
the Department of the Interior, and if necessary directly with the Congress 
which has ultimate responsibility for and power over tribal administration. 
One example of this last type of activity by a tribally retained general 
counsel was the securing of a public school building for a reserve commu-
nity. The federal government had made funds generally available for local 
school construction through Public Law 815. The attorney carried out all 
the steps necessary to qualify^ the school district and secure funds under 
this law. As the final step, because all of the land within the reserve was 
tribally owned trust-status land, he persuaded one of the senators from his 
state, a personal friend sincerely interested in Indian welfare, to sponsor 
a bill in Congress to set aside a plot for the school. 
The general counsel of a tribe is sometimes able to play off one part 
of the dominant soeietyTs governmental apparatus against another for the 
benefit of his Indian clients. Officials of one Southwestern reserve applied 
for permission to begin growing cotton, a very profitable cash crop, as part 
of their economic development program. The local Department of Agricul-
ture official with powers of approval informed them that no reservation land 
could be planted to cotton under the price support program because the tribe 
had not previously grown this crop and the county's permitted acreage was 
already allotted to non-Indian farmers who had grown it previously. The 
tribeTs general counsel contacted a senator from the state with a record of 
friendship to Indians. Then he was able to telephone the Department of 
Agriculture official to say: "Senator X thought the tribe could obtain an 
allotment for thirty-five acres of cotton. " The allotment was approved. 
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In the event interaction in this triangular pattern i s not effective in 
gaining ends sought by his tribal client, the attorney provides a bridge from 
the tribe to the general population by which political action can be initiated. 
This may be thought of as a quadrilateral interaction, an initial stimulus 
moving horizontally from the tribe to its attorney and his political associ-
ates and the populace at large. Then it moves vertically to the national 
government in the form of protest campaigns, petitions and/or actual vot-
ing. One of the striking examples of this type of interaction pattern was the 
efficient mobilization of public opinion behind the tribal (and attorney) posi-
tion opposing the attempt of former Commissioner of Indian Affair s Dillon S. 
Myer to propose administrative regulations governing attorney contracts .2 8 
Having reached Washington, the impulses of this interaction pattern 
spread horizontally through the various departments, particularly that of 
Interior and specifically the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and then descend ver-
tically through the chain of bureaucratic command to the tribe again (see 
Diagram III). In the example cited, the tribes successfully resisted the 
proposed regulations, which were disapproved by the then Secretary of the 
Interior. 
The tribally retained general counsel also provides his clients with a 
direct window looking into state government, an increasingly significant 
area of tribal concern. In 1954, for example, one tribal attorney persuaded 
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the long-resistant Arizona State Welfare administration to approve its first 
grant of general aid to a reservation resident (Arizona Daily Star, Dec. 22, 
1954). Although legally entitled to such state aid, no reservation Indian had 
received it until an elderly woman on the San Carlos Apache jurisdiction 
was granted assistance through the work of tribal attorneys, "just doing a 
job for our client." Another tribal attorney in this state advised his r e s e r -
vation clients to proceed with their economic development program involv-
ing drilling deep irrigation wells despite state legislation prohibiting fur-
ther well-drilling in critical areas . When the state Attorney General threat-
ened to prosecute Indians, the tribal attorney — a former county chairman 
of the political party to which the state official belonged — pointed out that 
the state lacked jurisdiction on the reserve and there were plenty of non-
Indian violators of the ground water code with whom the Attorney General 
could well concern himself. No Indian drillers were prosecuted. 
It must be pointed out that the phrase "responsible democracy" in the 
title of this paper applies not merely to the experience of Indian tribesmen, 
but equally to that of their attorneys. The examples of attorney achievement 
cited in this discussion have all been drawn from the relatively open demo-
cratic society in the United States. Not all societies are equally open nor 
do attorneys occupy an equally powerful position in all. In agrarian socie-
ties dominated by land owners, the lawyer who attempts to represent sub-
ordinate group members may expose himself to serious attack. Certain 
Peruvian Indians engaged in a terri torial dispute with a powerful landlord 
charge, for example, that the latter had deprived them of the right to legal 
defense by the simple expedient of charging each of four attorneys the 
Indians hired with complicity in their alleged misdeeds. 29 i n another case, 
an attorney who undertook to represent Indian laborers on the estate of a 
Peruvian senator found himself imprisoned for obstructing the administra-
tion of justice. 30 
The implications of this largely new social structure of intergroup 
interaction for cultural change among U.S. tribal peoples are considerable. 
A much wider sample of the culture of the dominant society becomes avail-
able to the tribesmen for borrowing, either directly from the tribal at tor-
ney or as a result of his efforts. A much larger proportion of what was 
previously interpreted as capricious and unpredictable behavior by mem-
bers of the dominant group is made comprehensible by the explanations of 
tribal attorneys, thereby reducing psychological s t ress in the interactions 
between tribes and the larger society. Broader acquaintance with the cul-
ture of the dominant groups results in acceptance of more alternatives: 
hiring specialists other than lawyers is one index of this change. Tribal 
officials a re trained by their attorneys in many practical techniques of 
social action in the politico-legal-business circles of the United States, 
even down to the level of the off-color joke. Indian leaders previously have 
not had such training, least of all in the Southwest. This is not to claim 
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that other important social mechanisms of Indian integration are not opera-
tive. The service of 25, 000 Indians in World War II led to the increasing 
participation of veterans in wider U.S. society. Rising Indian literacy has 
permitted increased Indian voting, recently taken into account by members 
of Congress. 31 The role of the tribal attorney is especially important, 
however, in its direct effects on Indian leaders as well as in obtaining bene-
fits for the general tribal population. 
The new social structure of tribal administration has important prac-
tical implications for administration of subordinate subcultural groups 
wherever they occur. This new interaction pattern which, places tribal 
general counsel in a key two-way interpretative role between subordinate 
and dominant groups has been rapidly adopted by tribal governments not so 
much for the hidden benefits stressed in this paper, but because of the visi-
ble and tangible benefits to tribesmen it yields. For example, a national 
highway passes through the village where most of the tribesmen reside on 
one reservation. When this tribe recovered lands long controlled by the 
Santa Fe railroad, business concerns operated by non-Indians paid twenty-
five dollars per year for the use of the land they occupied. The tribal attor-
ney upped this income from a few hundred dollars to $5, 000 per year. Later 
he negotiated the first timber cutting contract this tribe had drawn for thirty 
years. More recently he has negotiated mining leases for this tribal client 
which provide assured income from advance royalties, and an advantageous 
contract for power generating rights. ^2 
On a different reserve with irrigated farm lands, BIA officials for 
many years told tribesmen who held trust allotments that they could lease 
their lands for only one dollar per acre annually. Leases ran indefinitely 
at the pleasure of the non-Indian lessee. Where tribal lands were leased 
along the reservation boundary, BIA officials saw that non-Indians operat-
ing adjacent farms were leased contiguous Indian acreage. The non-Indian 
farmers then drilled wells on their own land near the boundary fence and 
pumped water to irrigate both plots. Improvement provisions written into 
BIA-drawn leases were not enforced. After the Indians on this reservation 
retained general counsel, he suggested that he be allowed to intervene in 
this situation. He put the leases up for competitive bidding and his clients 
received as much as $45 per acre per year for leases limited to five years. 
He enforced, furthermore, existing improvement provisions that perma-
nent improvements were to be made on the leased lands and left there at the 
end of the lease period. At one time he was simultaneously prosecuting two 
lease-holders for contract violations in matters of fencing, land leveling 
and drilling wells on the reserve land instead of just across the fence. In 
addition, if cotton were grown on these leased Indian lands, the leasehold-
ers paid a royalty on each bale produced over a stated minimum. 
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Another attorney negotiated a settlement of $2, 800, 000 with the U.S. 
Corps of Engineers for the loss of Indian property rights for which the 
Corps originally offered exactly nothing. 
Some of the psychological benefits Indians have derived through the 
retaining of general counsel have been obtained directly as a result of the 
creation of a more advantageous economic position. In an Arizona town 
adjacent to a reserve, theaters, until 1952, segregated Indian patrons in 
their seating. Then the town government renegotiated its lease on a section 
of reserve lands used as the local airport. With the tribal attorney guiding 
negotiations, discrimination was brought under discussion. Discriminatory 
seating of Indian theater customers ended. 
This sort of increase in the tribal share of the benefits of the national 
socio-political structure apparently does result in the kind of therapy John 
Collier had in mind in encouraging tribal self-government. Self-government 
in itself may be therapeutic, but successful self-government of the type 
resulting from retention of tribal legal counsel is certainly dynamic in its 
results in tribal societies. This success in increasing the tribal share of 
benefits objectively reduces the degree of subordination of the tribesmen. 
This appears as the true therapy: bringing subordinate groups into a more 
egalitarian socio-economic position within the national polity, 33 i n part by 
destroying "artificially" created barr iers to self-development^4 and permit-
ting that Indian participation in planning and shaping its own future which is 
essential for successful cultural change. 35 
Since the total store of benefits in any society is fixed at any point in 
time, it might appear that by gaining an increased share tribal groups sub-
tract from the portion of the dominant group. However, this does not seem 
to be the case simply because the change in interaction patterns is going on 
through time concurrently with an increase in total benefits. The economic 
cost of geographically segregated tribal populations in the United States has 
been relatively high. Indeed, it constitutes a drain on the national economy, 
as is readily discerned in the annually mounting appropriations to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs during a period in which it has tried to "work itself 
out of a job. " On the other hand, as tribal government becomes more suc-
cessful, tribal economies become less of an economic drain. While the San 
Carlos Apaches, for example, have developed their tribal program with the 
aid of general counsel (and other outside help), they have integrated more 
and more into the economy and society of the Southwest and the nation. They 
have developed business and employment opportunities on their reservation 
for many Apaches who would previously have had to leave to compete with 
non-Indians for the jobs available elsewhere until their tribal herds and 
other tribal business enterprises were organized. 36 The motel and restau-
rant operated by the Navajo Tribe at Window Rock and Shiprock (New York 
Times, May 3, 1964) create Indian employment and additional capital in the 
same way as tribally leased oil, gas and uranium ore deposits. When the 
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Mescalero Apaches borrowed money from the BIAto purchase a $2, 000, 000 
ski facility at Sierra Blanea in Lincoln National Forest, they entered upon a 
large scale campaign for profits from the tourist trade. Individual Indian 
employment was only a long-range possibility dependent upon training suit-
able candidates (New York Times, Nov. 3, 1963). In effect, as each tribal 
community increases its integration into national socio-political patterns, 
a new Mpoint in time11 is reached at which the total store of benefits availa-
ble to the society as a whole has increased. 
A corollary proposition is that the possibility of nativistic movements, 
separatist movements or revolt is lessened as psychological s t ress in the 
tribal population decreases. Significantly the clearest example of a nativ-
istic movement among U. S. tribal peoples today seems to be a faction known 
as "Traditional Hopi Chiefs. " Indulging in histrionics such as sending ulti-
mata to the President forbidding drafting of Hopi youth on religious grounds, 
or threatening to secede, this movement exists in a linguistic group where 
the formal self-governing apparatus above the native village level consti-
tutes merely another faction, so the experience of successful self-determi-
nation remains elusive for lack of ability to make decisions. 
A specific characteristic of the present situation in tribal administra-
tion in the U.S. is that a dominant group imposes a gbvernment-of-law upon 
subordinate groups. In a statute-stifled society such as this one, attorneys 
inevitably assume a central role in determining the distribution of financial, 
social and political benefits within the total social structure. For this r ea -
son subordinate peoples must be specifically free to employ their own com-
petent legal counsel if they a re to maximize their share of socio-political 
benefits and avoid severe psychological s t ress . 
It is doubtful whether John Collier foresaw that this particular aspect 
of tribal self-government would assume the importance it has. Nor is there 
any reason to expect any social scientist to predict correctly in such detail 
all the consequences of an action program. It is as a social scientist that 
Collier is viewed in this paper, aside from his role as one of the great 
moralists and preachers of our time3? who can laud tribal non-linear con-
ceptions of time as "society-building, action-sustaining, wisdom-giving" 
and even "world-shaping. "38 hi his more sober writing Collier has. con-
sistently employed the same indices of success of his program of tribal 
administration. These are in the main the biological index of Indian birth 
rate relative to death rate, and the economic index of rate of loan repay-
ment. Collier claimed that the Indian death rate fell fifty-five percent in 
less than ten years, and that of over $10, 300, 000 loaned in a decade only 
$69, 000 was delinquent.39 
These statements^0 Collier still repeats, and others follow his lead.41 
Actually, the loan repayment index does not show such "good" Indian behav-
ior, a "serious delinquency" situation having come about early in the last 
decade. 2 
Therapeutic Experience of Responsible Democracy 183 
In other words, CollierTs evaluation of his own program appears fro-
zen to indices he envisioned at the time of its formulation, and he now feels 
that relations between Indian and government and whites in general have 
become productive.4 3 Collier attributes these improved relations to an 
about-face in Indian policy by the Eisenhower administration in 1958, which 
returned to New Deal policies. 44 He seems not to have appreciated the 
extent to which tribal self-government in the United States has advanced 
beyond the Phase I type operations and activities he originally predicted so 
that additional indices should be used to evaluate the accuracy of his p r e -
dictions as to the therapeutic effects of responsible democracy upon tribal 
peoples. As already indicated, other social scientists specifically evaluat-
ing the Collier program appear to have analyzed it largely on Collier's own 
terms. Spicer has, however, stressed the need for Indian economic inter-
dependence with other peoples in the Southwest as a precondition for self-
determination in modern industrial society. 4 5 He pointed out that such 
interdependence as has developed has emerged on the basis of wage labor 
by Indian individuals, yet recognized that the individual may abandon tribal 
life — and the fact that many do so constitutes one major factor stabilizing 
several tribal soc ie t ies . 4 6 Wage labor can be, in other words, the eco-
nomic basis for only the most minimally rewarding sor t of tribal self-
government in the highly capitalized modern society. 
The impact of tribal attorneys upon tribal self-government suggests 
the following list of additional appropriate indices for evaluation: 
(1) Realized dollar income of tribal governments and tribesmen from 
land leases for farming, mining, logging, e tc . , and tribal business enter-
pr ises , relative to resource potential. 
(2) Overt discrimination by adjacent non-Indian population toward 
any reservation population. 
(3) Level of psychological s t ress in the tribal population, as meas -
ured by nativistic movements (negatively), or conscious cultural pluralism 
(positively) or smaller scale phenomena. 
In conclusion, it appears that in terms of such indices as these, Col-
l ie r ' s prediction of the dynamic quality of tribal self-determination was 
essentially correct. The employment of non-Indian specialists, particu-
larly attorneys, by tribal governments, is one sign that tribal peoples are 
truly developing that "more true self-government and less dependence on a 
government bureau for protection" which Embree pointed out is a necessary 
condition "if they are not to become exploited all over again as Indians. " 4 7 
The examples of attorney action on behalf of tribal clients cited in this paper 
have indeed increased tribal lease income, diminished overt racial d is -
crimination against Indians and apparently reduced psychological s t resses 
among reservation inhabitants. 
Cornell University 
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Footnotes: 
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